It is recognized that Buddhadharma schools are markedly ontologically, epistemologically, and semantically nominalist. Regardless of that, when it comes to the use of the term “consciousness”, there is still a tendency in some Western circles to understand Buddhism in a solipsist or monist way. To this purpose, I argue that the general expression “consciousness” from Buddhadharma texts must be understood according to traditional nominalist Buddhist semantics and theory of entities. In the end, I briefly mention some arguments and viewpoints – defending the plurality/diversity of consciousness – of some Buddhist Dzogchen scholars and masters
This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and profound corre...
This dissertation explores the debate over mental content (ākāra) between the Indian Buddhist philos...
In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Perso...
It is recognized that Buddhadharma schools are markedly ontologically, epistemologically, and semant...
In the following, it will be argued that Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 CE) adopts a Buddhist nominalism that en...
Transpersonal psychology has at times employed Buddhist terminology in ways that do not reflect dist...
Within scholars that accept a psychological theory of Buddhism, there are who have longtime recogniz...
The sphere (gocara) in which Buddhahood abides is the Absolute Reality (paramārtha) which surpasses ...
In Advaita Vedanta a distinction is made between an experience of oneness and permanent awakening. T...
In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By Buddhist phenomenology, I mean...
Isn’t there is logical disagreement in Buddhism’s dual theses: 1) humans tend toward incorrectly imp...
There’s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience ...
In this article, I address divergent Buddhist positions on conceptual and non-conceptual understandi...
This chapter pursues the question of naturalism in the context of non-Western philosophical contribu...
This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and profound corre...
This dissertation explores the debate over mental content (ākāra) between the Indian Buddhist philos...
In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Perso...
It is recognized that Buddhadharma schools are markedly ontologically, epistemologically, and semant...
In the following, it will be argued that Nāgārjuna (ca. 150 CE) adopts a Buddhist nominalism that en...
Transpersonal psychology has at times employed Buddhist terminology in ways that do not reflect dist...
Within scholars that accept a psychological theory of Buddhism, there are who have longtime recogniz...
The sphere (gocara) in which Buddhahood abides is the Absolute Reality (paramārtha) which surpasses ...
In Advaita Vedanta a distinction is made between an experience of oneness and permanent awakening. T...
In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By Buddhist phenomenology, I mean...
Isn’t there is logical disagreement in Buddhism’s dual theses: 1) humans tend toward incorrectly imp...
There’s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience ...
In this article, I address divergent Buddhist positions on conceptual and non-conceptual understandi...
This chapter pursues the question of naturalism in the context of non-Western philosophical contribu...
This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and profound corre...
This dissertation explores the debate over mental content (ākāra) between the Indian Buddhist philos...
In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Perso...